



THE INDIAN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN SRI LANKA, 1987-90:

A CASE STUDY IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

**A Monograph
by**

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ABSTRACT

THE INDIAN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IN SRI LANKA, 1987-90: A CASE STUDY IN OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR by MAJ. James D. Scudieri, USA, 70 pages.

This monograph analyzes the Indian experience of Operations Other Than War (OOTW) in Sri Lanka, a large, tropical island off the southern tip of India. The Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF), a reinforced division, deployed to monitor a cease-fire between the majority Sinhalese government and Tamil guerrillas and to supervise the turn-in of weapons by the various Tamil militant groups. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the most fanatical of the guerrilla organizations, The IPKF transitioned to peace enforcement operations and grew to a corps of four divisions and three independent infantry brigades.

The paper provides background on the ethnic and religious turmoil which has plagued Sri Lanka for decades. It then explains the Indian geo-political objectives as regional power broker which prompted the ratification of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord on 29 July 1987. This agreement gave the IPKF its mandate. The text traces the IPKF through three significantly-different missions as the Accord breaks down: peace keeping, an assault on an urban guerrilla stronghold, and a protracted rural insurgency. Maps place the discussion in its strategic, operational, and tactical contexts. An Appendix provides a tentative Order of Battle of the IPKF.

The monograph emphasizes the tactical "lessons learned" of the IPKF and their ramifications for future American OOTW. The analysis suggests that planning and training activities should anticipate "mission creep." More effective and efficient units prepared to conduct the full range of potential assignments in OOTW would result.

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BACKGROUND TO SRI LANKA

Introduction

Sri Lanka, formerly Ceylon, is a tropical island in the Indian Ocean separated from the southern tip of India by the Palk Strait. The south is mountainous, with a large massif in the central part of the island which descends to the flat northern peninsula. The country, roughly 270 by 170 miles, is covered with forest, jungle, scrub, and plantations.¹ The majority ethnic group is Buddhist Sinhalese who dominate the government. The largest minority are the native-born Hindu Tamils concentrated in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Indian Tamils, descendants of the original Indian emigre plantation workers, live mostly in the Central Provincial area.² The capital, Colombo, lies along the southwest coast.³

Civil war has plagued Sri Lanka for decades.⁴ Between 1983-87 the ethnic and religious turmoil between government forces and the various native Tamil militant groups had achieved only political and military stalemate. India as regional superpower sought an end to the conflict. Consequently, India and Sri Lanka signed an Accord on 29 July 1987 to broker a political settlement. This Accord made provision for an Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to monitor a cease-fire and supervise the turn-in of weapons from all Tamil guerrillas.

The IPKF, hailed as liberators by the war-weary Tamils, soon clashed with the principal Tamil militant organization,

the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Peace keeping became peace enforcement.

The experience of the IPKF in Sri Lanka provides United States military officers with a case study in the breadth of versatility required in contingency operations. Within nine weeks the Indian troops abandoned peace keeping, stormed an urban guerrilla stronghold, and then fought a rural insurgency which lasted for over two years. Troop levels increased from one infantry division to four with two independent brigades. There are insights into the tactical challenges of versatility regarding training and planning to avoid "mission creep," as well as the inseparability of tactical, operational, and strategic issues.

The Colonial Legacy

British domination of Ceylon for over two centuries established a plantation economy and modern, representative government. The British at first sought economic advantage not imperial acquisition. By 1796 the Madras Government ruled Ceylon, but the island reverted to Crown Colony status in 1802.⁵ The island's administrative link and proximity to the Indian mainland facilitated the importation of Indian labor to work the coffee, rubber, and tea plantations.⁶ The British thus imposed a monetary economy based on commercial liberalism with a social structure which mirrored in many ways the old feudal one based on caste and service.⁷

This cheap labor source, the so-called "Indian-Tamils," remained the focus of debate on colonial labor policy.⁸ While there had been general cooperation among groups at least between 1899-1911, racism grew in the 1930s.⁹ Hence, a total ban on further emigration became effective 1 August 1939. A restructuring of the plantations actually witnessed the return of many workers to India in 1941-42. However, a decree of 8 December 1942 lifted the ban due to the loss of resources in Malaya and Burma to Japanese conquests.¹⁰

Meanwhile, governing institutions developed gradually. For nearly a century, 1833-1912, the Legislative Council formed in 1815 acquired increasing legislative and financial powers.¹¹ By 1918 a broad coalition of English-educated elites from the different ethnic and religious groups had emerged, the result of a British attempt to create an ethnic mosaic.¹²

Political reformers sought to establish genuine representative government with a view towards eventual independence. Thus, the 1926-27 Donoughmore Commission's recommendations to abolish communal representation in favor of territorial representation and universal suffrage became law in 1931. The Soulbury Commission of 1944-45 essentially endorsed their continuation, effectively giving Ceylon a Westminster-style government. It did agree to provisions which provided greater representation to ethnic minorities.¹³

This emphasis on the rule of law made the colonial period remarkably tranquil. British centralization left behind a formidable political legacy of stability.¹⁴ Clashes between religious groups did occur but they did not draw clear Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic lines.¹⁵ Local police easily contained the few "nationalist reactions."¹⁶

Nonetheless, Britain's greatest contribution to Ceylon was a legacy of centralized political stability within the context of representative institutions. The emigration of the Indian Tamils did not create an ethnic problem. Native-born Tamils and Muslims already lived on the island.

The Conflict Prior to Intervention, 1948-87

Ceylon evolved along the road of ethnic strife because ruling elites consistently chose short-term, selfish expediency over genuine efforts to govern for the common good. Sinhalese political leaders cultivated the notion of restoring Ceylon's great Sinhalese past. They created a public opinion bent upon a radical linguistic nationalism with religious, caste, and class overtones.¹⁷ The Tamils, frustrated at the failure of political institutions to address grievances in the British tradition, turned to militancy.

Statistics vary but the numbers and distribution of the people are fairly straightforward. Figures compiled in September 1992 showed a population of 17.4 million. The Sinhalese numbered 74 percent; Tamils, 12.6 percent; Indian

Tamils, 5.6 percent; and Muslims, 7.1 percent. Most people were Buddhist, 69.3 percent, followed by 15.5 percent Hindu, 7.6 percent Islamic, and 7.5 percent Christian.¹⁸ The Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Tamils shared a common language and the Hindu faith, but considered themselves apart. The native-born Tamils deemed the Indian Tamils to be second-rate citizens and seldom intermarried.¹⁹

The first blow against this multi-cultural society came on the heels of independence. The Citizenship Act of 1948 and the Indian and Pakistan Resident Act of 1949 disenfranchised the Indian Tamils. They now became "stateless persons" since India did not recognize them as nationals either.²⁰ Moreover, the elimination of the Indian Tamils as a political entity gave yet more REPRESENTATIVES to the Sinhalese majority.

Further injury came with the Official Language Act of 1956 which made Sinhalese the only official tongue of the land. This legislation not only dismissed the Tamil language in an ostensibly multi-cultural nation state, but also devastated Tamil opportunities in the civil service and education. The Northern and Eastern Provinces with predominantly native Tamil populations were particularly incensed.²¹

Certainly the most sustained Sinhalese attack was a cultural one. The post-war period witnessed the comprehensive, official promulgation of the superiority of

the Sinhalese civilization, past and present, which prompted a backlash response from the Tamils.²²

The press, academics, and political commentators not only supported, but exacerbated these antagonistic tendencies. They trumpeted past cultural myths as pure truth and genuine history.²³ Newspaper debate successfully constructed opposing nationalisms. The reinterpretation of national heroes aroused nationalist sentiment.²⁴ The role of these intellectuals was important. They created a currency and urgency to ethnic hate largely absent in Ceylonese history.²⁵ Thus, one finds a newspaper debate over the validity of an independent Tamil kingdom in Jaffna Peninsula during the thirteenth century! Politics figured prominently in culture so a past-oriented nationalist discourse resulted.²⁶

These manufactured, politicized, clashing cultures became particularly destructive. Thus, while the Tamils were a distinct minority, the Sinhalese developed a siege mentality.²⁷ They displayed "a near apocalyptic fear of being overrun by Dravidian Tamils."²⁸ The Sinhalese lumped all Tamils together and viewed the Indian member state of Tamil Nadu, formerly Madras, as a mere staging point for further invasions of Sri Lanka as had occurred repeatedly in their views of history. The motif of Tamil invasion became a divisive historical tradition employed to the near exclusion of those which might unify.²⁹

Religion merely fueled the growing hatred instead of promoting tolerance and patience. This reaction is initially surprising given the non-violent nature of Buddhism. Unfortunately, the combination of ethnic, cultural, and religious differences among the Sinhalese and Tamils hardened attitudes.³⁰ Religion became twisted for political ends. This political misuse of religion was especially damaging in a society where religion was intertwined with all aspects of life.³¹ While Christians were few in number, they acknowledged a collective failure to contribute to healing.³²

Ethnic hatred also became the explanation for economic shortcomings. Sinhalese leaders of the 1950s averted their fear of a class war by placating the electorate and blaming the Tamils for bad times.³³ Such rabid ideology found ready ears among an economically-marginalized Sinhalese population.³⁴ There was increased competition for a bigger piece of a fixed national pie, so fewer jobs existed for a growing population. The Tamils also faced jobbery, nepotism, and political favoritism. They were further appalled at governmental settlement of Sinhalese in areas considered Tamil "traditional homelands."³⁵ Such settlement threatened to alter the Tamil majority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Three milestones pushed this stalemate to civil war. First, the General Election of 1970 made Sirimavo Bandaranaike Prime Minister. Wife of the former Prime

Minister between 1956-59, she had already served as Prime Minister during 1960-65. She ruled rather than governed as shown by her prompt and violent suppression of Sinhalese youth demonstrations in 1971. Her true infamy in Tamil eyes came when she changed Ceylon's name to the Sinhalese Sri Lanka. Her administration thus acted as a strong indication of a resuscitated, jingoistic Sinhalese nationalism.

Second, Junius R. Jayewardene succeeded her as Prime Minister in 1977. In 1978 he converted the Westminster-pattern government to one like the French Fifth Republic. He became its first Executive President, a major consolidation of his political power. Jayewardene then instituted a free-market economy in place of the heavily state-controlled apparatus of his predecessors. The ensuing economic and social dislocation fed ethnic antipathies.³⁶

The third and key event was the rioting which broke out in July 1983. This latest round of violence, focused heavily in the capital of Colombo, underlined the utter lack of domestic tranquility in Sri Lanka. One estimate of the toll was 471 killed and 3,769 wounded with 93,000 Tamils rendered homeless and 122 Tamil-owned factories destroyed in Colombo alone.³⁷ Some 64,000, a third of Colombo's Tamil population, went to refugee camps.³⁸ The government invoked the Emergency Regulations of the Public Security Act for the sixth time since independence. Previous crises saw these extreme measures in effect for two to five years at a stretch.³⁹ Past experience also proved the tendency of Sri

Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) and security elements towards excesses in the name of public order.

The heavy casualties and extent of damage also ushered in greater outside interest in the conflict. India would not turn a blind eye to events in Sri Lanka.⁴⁰ Tamil expatriates, some 100,000 in the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand waged an effective information war and sullied Sri Lanka and jeopardized valued foreign aid.

Meanwhile, the Jayewardene administration did not abandon negotiations. For example, an All Party Conference (APC) in July 1984 considered new proposals to solve the Tamil problem. India mediated face-to-face meetings between the Sri Lankan government and several Tamil groups in July-August 1985 at Thimphu, Bhutan. No settlement agreeable to all parties concerned emerged. Thereafter, increasing government intransigence indicated a desire to implement a military solution after mid-1986.

The trends between 1948-83 were clear. The Sinhalese majority had been steadily eroding Tamil rights of participation in a bona fide multi-cultural nation state. Moreover, the Sinhalese had done so using legal institutions. The Tamils demanded redress. This situation developed into political stalemate. The Tamils were repeatedly unsuccessful in correcting or balancing these Sinhalese victories.⁴¹ The Tamils escalated their demands in the face of delayed reconciliation. They thus saw

autonomy as the only viable solution. Yet, the Sinhalese believed autonomy would merely be the precursor to separatism.⁴² It was.

The political and economic transformations of the Jayewardene government and the bloody riots in July 1983 pushed some Tamils towards a political platform calling for just such a separation, the independent state of Tamil Eelam. However, India, the giant neighbor to the north, was about to cast her vote.

THE INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

Political Imperatives, Foreign and Domestic

Both Indian foreign policy and domestic politics combined to make Sri Lankan stability of vital national interest. The despatch of the IPKF was the use of the military instrument to insure that stability.

Post-war Indian leaders had little trouble envisioning their country as South Asia's preeminent, regional superpower. Their conduct was a legacy of the British Raj which had intervened around the world.⁴³ Between 1948 and 1983 India became involved in six countries on nine occasions: Burma, Indonesia, Nepal, Tibet, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka (1971).⁴⁴

Indian security was perforce primarily concerned with Pakistani and Chinese behavior. Mutual antipathy and

extensions of Cold-War tensions insured a sharp focus along these two hostile borders.⁴⁵

Sri Lanka, however, was and remains an issue of vital national interest. At one point the Palk Strait which separates India and Sri Lanka narrows to a mere twelve miles. This proximity prompted the twin perception of southern Indian coastal vulnerability and the island as integral to India's oceanic defense. These concerns accelerated following India's disillusionment with the West after 1952-53.⁴⁶ Improved relations with the Soviet Union complicated this goal further. India had to discourage Sri Lankan overtures to the West, nations whose economic stakes in Sri Lanka had increased in consonance with the policies inaugurated by the Jayewardene administration.

India also had to monitor Sri Lankan politics to insure her own internal tranquility. India's democracy is fragile and sensitive to ethno-religious turmoil. The Indian state of Tamil Nadu, formerly Madras, is home to fifty-five of the sixty million Tamils in the world.⁴⁷ The welfare of Sri Lankan Tamils was an issue of considerable domestic concern as reflected by the volume of economic and other aid which flowed from Tamil Nadu to Sri Lanka's Northern Province.⁴⁸

One would be hard pressed to underestimate this domestic aspect of India's foreign policy. Between 1973-85 alone, the Indian Army deployed some forty-three times in support of the civil government to quell domestic disturbances. While these disorders included economic actions such as

strikes, the majority were due to communal or tribal unrest.⁴⁹

So India sought a viable political solution which preserved the Sri Lankan state intact but also recognized Tamil rights. The Indian national government could not end aid to Sri Lankan Tamil militants from Tamil Nadu outright. The ethnic links were too strong, fed as they were by Madras' position as a refuge for Tamils on the run from Sri Lankan authorities. At the same time, however, the loudly-proclaimed Tamil platform for the separate state of Tamil Eelam after 1983 was also unacceptable. India's federalism is a delicate balance. A divided Sri Lanka would have been a dangerous precedent with potentially disastrous internal Indian consequences.

India accordingly continued efforts to broker a genuine political solution. Thus, within four days of the outbreak of the July 1983 rioting, the External Affairs Minister was in Colombo making an on-the-spot assessment. By November Sri Lanka had proposed a new Regional Council for both the Northern and Eastern Provinces by merging the disparate District Development Councils (DDCs), subject to current Council members' consent and a popular referendum. The Tamils rejected the offer. In June 1984 Jayewardene offered to establish a second chamber in Sri Lanka's National Assembly, but without result. The Thimphu (in Bhutan) talks in July and August 1985 were a noble attempt to get the antagonists talking face to face. Proposals in 1986

actually incorporated ideas taken from the Indian Constitution. India and Sri Lanka also settled the issue of the stateless persons.⁵⁰

These initiatives did not prevent the issuance of strong public statements as warranted. For example, on 22 March 1986 Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi said that his government was having trouble understanding just what Sri Lanka wanted to end the ethnic problem. Throughout 1987 India warned Sri Lanka about trying to implement a military solution with the attendant civilian deaths and threatened to end its efforts as mediator. On 24 March Gandhi stated that India might have to resort to unilateral action.⁵¹

Indian policy became more aggressive in June 1987. On the third a previously-announced relief convoy carrying humanitarian aid attempted to dock at Jaffna City but the Sri Lankan Navy forced it to return home. The Indian government was furious. This time the Air Force flew relief supplies to Jaffna by transport aircraft with fighter escort on the next day.⁵²

More significantly, India had already acted unilaterally. In one of the most prolonged covert operations ever revealed, India was actively aiding Tamil militants in Sri Lanka in their struggle and using them to further her own ends.

In essence, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the equivalent of the CIA which answered directly to the Prime Minister, began training and equipping up to twenty thousand

Tamil guerrillas from August 1983. RAW set up training camps in Sri Lanka, not surprisingly in Tamil Nadu too, but also in northern India. Tamil Nadu in effect became a border sanctuary. Suitably trained and equipped, these guerrillas waged a constant, hit-and-run warfare against SLAF. In return they spied for India, gathering intelligence on the Sri Lankan security forces in the northeastern portion of the country; the naval base at Trincomalee; and any foreign naval presence established there.⁵³ Instructors were RAW employees, including retired Indian Army officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs).⁵⁴

RAW believed that they could control the militants; strengthen them to force the Sri Lankan government into some sort of political devolution; and challenge the emerging foreign military influence in Sri Lanka. RAW saw the conflict as in fact an extension of the Cold War.⁵⁵ They would use Sri Lankan Tamils to help thwart encroaching Western influences.

Covert operations accordingly fell into four phases. Phase One, pre-October 1984, consisted mostly of general intelligence activities until the July 1983 riots which prompted the initiation of large-scale training of Tamils. Phase Two, October 1984-October 1986, was the heyday of RAW's work with the militants while also playing the various groups, thirty-seven of them, against one another. The LTTE emerged as the most powerful body during this stage. Unfortunately for RAW, they also became increasingly

independent. Phase Three, October 1986-May 1990, demonstrated RAW's failure to control the LTTE. Phase Four, May 1991-late 1992, saw a crackdown against the LTTE and their supporters in Tamil Nadu, and cooperation with Sri Lankan intelligence and security agencies.⁵⁶

RAW's great ambitions failed with disastrous consequences. The organization proved unable to curb the LTTE. Moreover, the national government could not even exercise total control over training operations within India since the overwhelming majority of support emanated from and occurred in Tamil Nadu.

These negotiations, bluster, and covert activities underlined India's determination to prevent Sri Lankan recourse to a military solution against the Tamils. The passage of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord on 29 July 1987 was the culmination of this objective.

Bona-fide implementation of the Accord would preserve political unity in Sri Lanka as well as recognize Tamil rights. Resolutions 2.1-2.6 required a one-year, trial, single administration for the Northern and Eastern Provinces combined. A referendum in the Eastern Province would determine if it remained with the Northern or secured its own. Resolution 2.16 made Tamil and English official languages in addition to Sinhalese. The key stipulation for the purposes of this analysis was the provision in point 6 of the Annexure to the Agreement to deploy an Indian Peace-Keeping Force to Sri Lanka "if so required."⁵⁷

Jayewardene was amenable to such a negotiated settlement since he faced a potential, two-front struggle. The Janata Vimukti Party (JVP) was a radical Sinhalese organization against Tamils, all Indians, and the ruling UNP's policies.⁵⁸ It began its own terrorist campaign in southern Sri Lanka.⁵⁹ The nation's military, already reeling from its failures to crush the Tamils, was in no condition to engage another opponent simultaneously. The Accord was thus as much a Gandhi-Jayewardene pact as an international agreement.

The Accord had a bizarre and ominous beginning. At the signing ceremony itself on 29 July in Colombo, a Sri Lankan naval rating in the guard of honor swung at Gandhi with his rifle. The sailor later told a fellow detainee in jail that he was part of a plot. Two accomplices were supposed to bayonet the Indian Prime Minister, but they failed to follow up his assault.⁶⁰ The media captured the scene on film.⁶¹

More foreboding was the public radio broadcast on 27 June by Velupillai Prabhakaran, leader of the LTTE. He rejected the Accord, claiming it ignored Tamil aspirations. However, he was in Tamil Nadu so Indian officials went behind closed doors to convince him to endorse the Accord.⁶²

His objections notwithstanding, the international reception to news of the Accord was very positive.⁶³ Sri Lankan Tamils greeted the news of a forthcoming IPKF with undisguised joy. After all, they had long considered India to be their only salvation from Sinhalese perfidy. Even the

LTTE had reiterated faith in India's mediatory role in December 1986. On 27 March 1987 they further agreed to participate in peace discussions provided that the Sri Lankan government ceased military operations.⁶⁴ The Accord not only accomplished an end to SLAF operations, but also confined all Sri Lankan troops and security personnel to barracks, disbanded all Home Guards, and withdrew para-military forces from the two Tamil provinces.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, the fatal flaw of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was this lack of wholehearted LTTE cooperation. When the IPKF deployed to Sri Lanka on 30 July 1987, the most dangerous Tamil militant organization represented a potential threat to the Accord's success. RAW's covert operations also remained in full swing and they continued during the IPKF's entire stay which coincided with Phase Three discussed above. Indian soldiers would die fighting guerrillas aided by India's premier intelligence organization and citizens from Tamil Nadu.

Introduction to the Post-Independence Indian Army

The IPKF was part of an army rich in tradition and victories on the battlefield. The British-Indian Army had functioned as a true imperial asset with world-wide deployments.⁶⁶ Moreover, throughout its history the old Indian Army had remained an all-volunteer force.⁶⁷

The Indian Army after independence maintained this fine reputation with good training, high morale, and apoliticism.

The breakup of Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan eliminated the ethnic strains though the division cost India prime recruiting areas.⁶⁸

Unfortunately, a reorganization of the defense structure in 1976 had resulted in reduced military participation in the highest-level government discussions. This situation may have led to the political decision to commit the IPKF with inadequate military advice. The senior element of the defense establishment was the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), renamed the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (ECC) in 1962. This body became the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet (PACC) in 1976 with a wider focus, encompassing both internal and external concerns. Since so much of the PACC's work was not defense related, the military was often absent.⁶⁹

Besides this reduced voice with their political overlords, all services suffered from a lack of jointness, a critical failing for a military contemplating force projection.⁷⁰ The Chiefs of Staff Committee (CSC) was a mere collection of three service chiefs who went their own way and who also acted as service Commanders in Chief (CINCs). The proposed solution was a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) but objections to his creation were many. Some politicians feared that a CDS would be a threat to democracy while the Air Force and Navy believed that he would insure Army domination.⁷¹ A Defence Planning Staff (DPS) created in 1986 was responsible for long-term planning. With

neither a clear charter nor much institutional support, and saddled with a system of annual budgeting, the DPS became the "Defunct Planning Staff."⁷²

Such liabilities notwithstanding, the modern Indian Army's accomplishments were considerable, including two victories over Pakistan in 1965 and 1971.⁷³ Military leaders had overcome the 1962 debacle fighting the Chinese.⁷⁴ Internal-security assignments provided experience in guerrilla warfare.⁷⁵

The Indian Army in 1987 boasted some 1,100,000 personnel divided into five Regional Commands called Field Armies.⁷⁶ They disposed nine corps, thirty-two divisions, and nineteen independent brigades.⁷⁷ A corps contained two or more divisions. A division had three brigades with 18,000 men. Brigades of 6,000 men included three battalions of one thousand men at full strength. These combat formations had strike, hold, or reserve roles. Strike units conducted offensive operations; hold, defensive operations; and reserve, either mission as required. Three, sometimes four, divisions received reserve roles at any one time.⁷⁸

India also maintained several contingents of elite troops. The Army fielded two independent parachute brigades (para bdes) and three individual paratrooper commando battalions (para cdo bns). The Special Frontier Force (SFF) consisted mostly of Tibetan refugees. The Special Group (SG), an anti-terrorist organization, also fell under the SFF. The National Security Group (NSG), consisting of a

Special Action Group (SAG) and Special Ranger Group (SRG), were responsible for counter-terrorism and hostage rescue. The Air Force's Aviation Research Centre was a special airlift wing. The Navy's Indian Marine Special Forces (IMSF) were the counterparts of the American SEALS. The Special Protection Group (SPG) guarded the Prime Minister.⁷⁹

The Sri Lankan operation remains shrouded in secrecy. The government allegedly had opted for intervention in April 1987; the Army began planning in May. The lack of jointness and details on the nature of the mission led to some frantic scurrying at high command levels. Planners formulated two principal options. One required Indian troops to interpose themselves between Sinhalese and Tamils in the northeastern portion of Sri Lanka. A reserve formation in southern India, recently designated an air assault formation, received the mission, 54 Infantry Division (Inf Div). The second initiated action in Colombo to protect the Jayewardene government against a coup attempt.⁸⁰ Indeed, while politicians negotiated the Accord, a naval task force carrying 10 Para Cdo Bn cruised offshore.⁸¹

THE INDIAN ARMY IN SRI LANKA

Military Operations, 1987-90

The IPKF was embarking upon a vague peacekeeping assignment. The absence of the United Nations raised basic questions over reporting channels. In fact, Jayewardene at

first believed that he commanded the IPKF! Chain of command aside, the IPKF had no clear mission beyond supervision of weapons collections. There were no contingency plans which anticipated either potential problems or "mission creep."

Troop movements began on 30 July under Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh. He was designated Overall Force Commander (OFC) as he was Officer Commanding (OC), Southern Command in southeastern India close to Sri Lanka. Maj. Gen. Harkirat Singh commanded 54 Inf Div, minus heavy weapons. The Division had to scatter its units around the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Only 91 Infantry Brigade (Inf Bde) went to Jaffna Sector, while 76 Inf Bde and 47 Inf Bde occupied Trincomalee Sector, the former at the port city of Trincomalee and the latter at Vavuniya in the interior.⁸²

Monitoring the turn-in of Tamil militant arms throughout August from these scattered positions was full of hidden complications. Prabhakaran himself finally agreed to a token, ceremonial surrender to India so Sri Lanka could issue the promised amnesty.⁸³ More arms trickled in. Unfortunately, neither India nor Sri Lanka had precise figures on how many weapons were in circulation. Most Tamil insurgent groups appeared to be taking the Accord to heart. The LTTE, however, gave up their worst equipment while burying the rest in caches. RAW had lost their Tiger agent so intelligence was lacking. The Indians learned later of further arms shipments from Singapore.⁸⁴

Then the IPKF became embroiled in law and order issues in September and early October. Sinhalese-Tamil tensions revived. Tamil militants resumed their internecine, bloody feuding, usually the LTTE versus the remainder.⁸⁵ The IPKF was caught in the middle and at first sought help from Sri Lankan police!⁸⁶ Yet the indigenous, uniformed forces were thoroughly discredited in Tamil eyes. All were now largely Sinhalese-manned and hence racially motivated. Their proven record for excesses against all civilians beckoned only further ethnic atrocities.⁸⁷

Indian troops suddenly had to fill this vacuum. The IPKF received instructions extending their mandate to include the maintenance of law and order.⁸⁸ The IPKF was wholly unprepared to assume such a mission, given their small numbers and limited mobility.⁸⁹

Two further incidents ruined the peace. Fifteen of seventeen Tigers captured by Sri Lankan naval forces at sea with smuggled weapons and other paraphernalia committed suicide on 5 October. Their deaths inaugurated a rampage throughout the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Soon after, on the eighth, the LTTE took five Indian para commandos prisoner and executed them in grisly fashion.⁹⁰

Both Gandhi and Jayewardene now agreed that the IPKF should now forcibly disarm the LTTE. Clearly, the organization's leadership was defying both states. They were making a mockery of the Accord.

The IPKF was about to engage the most fanatical of the Tamil militant groups.⁹¹ Well organized with a charismatic senior leadership and thoroughly capable chain of command, the organization was not politically doctrinaire.⁹² However, each LTTE guerrilla wore a necklace which bore a vial of cyanide. One historian estimated that some 10 percent of the Tigers committed suicide in the course of the conflict to avoid capture.⁹³

The LTTE matched this dedication with heavy firepower. Most guerrillas used 7.62mm AK-47 and G-3 assault rifles.⁹⁴ The LTTE worked hard to obtain such weaponry. They were involved in outright arms smuggling, gun running, and even drugs to raise funds. Such dealing also yielded American M-16A1s from Vietnam; Chinese T-56s, an AK-47 copy; and a host of submachine guns (SMGs) and light and heavy machine guns (LMGs and HMGs), including American .30 cal and .50 cal. models. Foreign mercenaries supplemented their earlier training at Indian hands.⁹⁵ The Tigers were also expert at mine warfare, booby traps, and ambushes.⁹⁶ They were masters at home production of simple weapons systems like mortar tubes, which they fielded in 50, 60, 81, 90, and even 150mm.⁹⁷

The IPKF now had to transition from peacekeeping to a full-scale offensive, dubbed Operation PAWAN.⁹⁸ The 36 Inf Div under Maj. Gen. R. P. Singh joined 54 Inf Div in country. Their objective was to "take down" the LTTE in one, bold sweep. The Indians knew that the heart of the

LTTE was in the Northern Province, especially in Jaffna City. Thus, the IPKF had to plan an attack against guerrillas in a city of some 100,000 people.⁹⁹ The various intelligence estimates generally agreed on an LTTE strength of 1,500 reinforced to 2,500 with headquarters (HQ) located in one of the University's buildings. Indian Army planners allocated four days for the offensive; it would take fifteen.

The IPKF was ill prepared for this radical change in mission. Indian soldiers had no experience fighting urban guerrillas. Moreover, they were, incredibly enough, anywhere between 30-50 percent short of authorized manpower.¹⁰⁰ This reduction was not uncommon for reserve units, who sent away many members on leave or to attend service schools. Furthermore, the reinforcements were committed to battle virtually as they got off their transports. There was no acclimation whatsoever nor time to institute any special training.

Operation PAWAN began just past midnight on 11 October when 103 men of 10 Para Cdo Bn disembarked from Mi-8 Hip helicopters in an open field near LTTE HQ, known as the "Command Centre." A thirty-man platoon from 13 Sikh Light Infantry (Lt Inf), who would remain to secure the landing zone (LZ) and accomplish a linkup with 72 and 91 Inf Bdes, followed. The para commandos attacked the Command Centre.¹⁰¹

The assault was a disaster. Communications security (COMSEC) was lacking, so the LTTE had intercepted some transmissions concerning the raid. The LZ was "hot," i.e. the incoming helicopters received small arms and heavy-weapons fire. The para commandos failed to destroy the HQ or to capture Prabhakaran, but were able to evade and escape, though not without loss. Ground troops never reached the platoon from 13 Sikh Lt Inf which was annihilated. Ammunition exhausted, the last three men made a futile bayonet charge. One wounded man was captured; the rest perished.¹⁰²

Five brigades then bore down on the city.¹⁰³ Clockwise, they were 41 Inf Bde, 91 Inf Bde, 72 Inf Bde, 115 Independent (Ind) Inf Bde, and 18 Inf Bde. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) were especially keen to minimize civilian casualties. Thus, the use of airpower was curtailed and the IPKF enjoyed minimal assistance from heavy equipment, which had only deployed in limited quantities in any case. The 65 Armoured Regiment (Armd Regt) with Soviet T-72 tanks had one squadron at Jaffna; the remainder of the regiment was with 36 Inf Div in Trincomalee Sector. The BMP-1 Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) of 25 Mechanized Infantry Battalion (Mech Inf Bn) were evenly divided, two companies each at Jaffna and Trincomalee.¹⁰⁴ Jaffna Sector had the 831 Light Regiment (Lt Regt), less one battery, of heavy mortars. An artillery regiment was at Trincomalee Sector.¹⁰⁵

Others have questioned this unit tally from the OFC. For example, two Indian officers stated that, as of 1 October, only four T-72s were at Jaffna and three at Trincomalee with another half squadron at Vavuniya and Batticaloa.¹⁰⁶ Another report implied that only three tanks supported the assault on Jaffna City.¹⁰⁷

Consequently, the urban fighting was furious. The LTTE was well entrenched. They had recently fought SLAF to a standstill from these very positions. The bloody combat house by house and street by street with increasing Indian casualties resulted in a more relaxed ROE. Airpower provided support, including Soviet Mi-25 Hind D helicopter gunships, and artillery fire as well.¹⁰⁸ Civilian fatalities increased. One report cited 1,000 dead and 25,000 homeless.¹⁰⁹ India finally announced the capture of Jaffna City on 26 October with 319 killed (KIA) and 1,039 wounded (WIA) or 1,358 total. The IPKF claimed Tiger losses of 1100 KIA.¹¹⁰

Seizure of Jaffna successfully ejected the LTTE but did not destroy them. There were no mass suicides either; survivors simply faded into the jungle. A new war had just begun.

The conflict became a rural guerrilla war in the villages and bush. The IPKF conducted four major operations in the Northern Province and two in the Eastern. Additional reinforcements arrived from India: 4 Inf Div, 57 Inf Div, and 55 Ind Inf Bde.¹¹¹ Meanwhile, Lieutenant General Singh

retired in February 1988 and Lt. Gen. A. S. Kalkat replaced him as OFC.

Operation VAJRA, February-March 1988, used four brigades to sweep the North, again to catch Prabhakaran. The LTTE lost valuable base camps but their leader escaped. Operation VIRAT TRISHUL, March 1988, was a follow-up designed to neutralize remaining enemy hideouts. Operation CHECKMATE, May-August 1988, focused on trapping the LTTE in the jungles around Mullaithivu on the east coast and Vavuniya. Operation TOOFAN, June 1989, was another attempt to subdue LTTE field strongholds. Operations TULIP BLOOM and SWORD EDGE were similar sweeps in the East.¹¹²

The IPKF bloodied the Tigers but never succeeded in eliminating them for several reasons. First, the Indians apparently wanted to isolate the enemy and use their now significant firepower assets to annihilate him. They staged large "cordon and search" operations.¹¹³ Such big-unit maneuvers rarely destroy guerrilla forces.

Second, Indian forces labored under psychological disadvantages. Many soldiers, especially in Madrassi units, had viewed the Tamils as friends in need of protection and adjusted poorly to the brutal reality of warring against them. The conflict was particularly frustrating for section leaders and platoon commanders.¹¹⁴ Third, ambivalence at higher levels was more confusing still. Should the IPKF annihilate the LTTE, what leverage would remain to insure a

viable political settlement upon India's withdrawal? Hence, what was an accurate description of the mission?

Unexpected political accommodation supplanted military options. A surprise cease-fire declaration of the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE in July 1989 ended all offensives. Ranasinghe Premadasa replaced Jayewardene as Executive President following the December 1988 Sri Lankan elections. Premadasa was determined to be rid of the IPKF. Indeed, he had wanted the IPKF gone by 29 July 1989. The maintenance of open government-militant dialogue was ample reason to judge the IPKF superfluous. The Indian and Sri Lankan governments debated the issue, but whatever mandate the IPKF held was over.

Withdrawal was in stages. The last contingent of Indian troops left Sri Lanka on 24 March 1990. Their departure and continued Sinhalese-Tamil talks did not bring peace. The Sri Lankan Army resumed costly offensive operations in 1990. Sri Lanka's ethnic groups still have reached no agreement.

The IPKF: An Evaluation

Within some nine weeks the IPKF's mission in Sri Lanka changed three times. They started as a peacekeeping force with an unclear purpose beyond the supervision of weapons' turn ins by Tamil militant groups. When ethnic tensions revived and the LTTE renewed its private war on rival Tamil groups, the IPKF was caught in the middle. Recourse to the Sri Lankan police was not a viable option.

The troops were wholly unprepared to assume law and order duties. No strangers to limited internal security operations, the IPKF was a light infantry force sent as peacekeepers. They lacked the training and transport to extend their writ all over the Northern and Eastern provinces.

The IPKF was even less prepared for peace enforcement on behalf of the Accord. The initial movement on 30-31 July 1987 had been hurried enough and had scattered the deployment of 54 Inf Div all over the island. When reinforcements rushed to Sri Lanka to participate in Operation PAWAN, the confusion was even worse. Thus, 54 Inf Div in Jaffna Sector commanded all three brigades normally under 36 Inf Div: 18, 41, and 72 Inf Bdes, as well its 91 Inf Bde and the 115 Ind Inf Bde. That left 36 Inf Div with 54 Inf Div's other two formations, 47 and 76 Inf Bdes, along with 340 Ind Inf Bde.¹¹⁵ Higher unit integrity was nonexistent.

The ensuing Battle for Jaffna City raised serious questions over functions and missions. Was PAWAN a realistic operation for the IPKF to accomplish? The Indian Army had never engaged urban guerrillas before and had no time to train for this contingency. Suddenly they faced the hard-core LTTE in fortified urban positions from which they had handily bloodied the Sri Lankan Army only months earlier.

Combat then brought the painful realization that the LTTE outgunned the IPKF. Commanders complained loudly about the LTTE's superiority in firepower.¹¹⁶ The Indian Army had license-produced Belgian 7.62mm FN FAL assault rifles with the designation AK MS. However, like the British self-loading rifle (SLR), it had no automatic-fire capability. It was strictly a semi-automatic weapon. The Indian Army had heretofore placed emphasis on individual marksmanship, not rate of fire. This philosophy was admirable for long-service professionals but inadequate to fight guerrillas. Indian soldiers had to rely on the section light machine gun (LMG) for automatic fire.

The Indians quickly instituted reform. Infantry battalions each received twenty-four 7.62mm SLR IC automatic rifles.¹¹⁷ The SLR IC is similar to the FN FAL heavy barrel except that it fires a burst of three to five rounds compared with the latter's ordinary automatic fire. However, an issue of twenty-four per battalion yielded a density of two per platoon. There are three sections, i.e. squads, per platoon so the IPKF required thirty-six per battalion in order to issue one per section. The Indian government also authorized a secret, one-time purchase of 70,000 AK-47s by RAW from Poland to reequip at least some units. These weapons became a favorite of elite troops and special forces.¹¹⁸

Conventional shortcomings aside, the IPKF demonstrated considerable skill in executing OOTW missions in both urban

and rural environments. Upon arrival in country, the troops set to work helping the people rebuild their shattered lives. Indian soldiers helped to clear roadblocks and to remove mines and booby traps. Engineer units set to work on the smashed transportation network, repairing roads, railway lines, and airfield runways. The medical services were very active providing treatment on demand and facilitating the reopening of commercial hospitals. The Indian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers (EME) played a key role fixing hospital equipment.¹¹⁹ The IPKF conducted this humanitarian assistance all over the Northern and Eastern Provinces wherever they had deployed.¹²⁰

This assistance extended to the planning and execution of civilian elections. When Jayewardene ordered the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces on 10 September 1988, he scheduled elections for October. Only the Herculean efforts of the IPKF assisted by Indian civil officials ensured success. The Sri Lankan government had done nothing to assign election personnel nor to prepare electoral rolls. Indian troops assured the opening of 324 of the 576 polling stations, provided security, and transportation.¹²¹

The Indian command also recognized the need to maintain responsive communications with the civilian community. The IPKF established complaint cells where local residents could inquire about missing persons, lost property, and even file charges against IPKF personnel. The OFC was quite pragmatic. He acknowledged that "soldiers are not angels by

any manner of means." He saw the folly of denying allegations of misconduct. He wanted charges investigated quickly and impartially.¹²²

This mutual respect no doubt suffered as a result of the Battle for Jaffna City. While many Indian soldiers died due to the initial ROE, the introduction of heavy firepower to subdue the LTTE in their urban strongholds caused considerable collateral damage.

The transition to a rural insurgency/guerrilla war provided greater challenges. There is frankly an imperfect understanding to what extent the LTTE enjoyed popular support beyond its much greater base in the Northern versus Eastern Province. The IPKF leadership, however, knew full well that they faced a different war. They were aware of the need to embark upon a long-term campaign to win the "hearts and minds" of the country people while maintaining military pressure on the Tigers. The OFC himself stated that a political solution was necessary to end the insurgency.¹²³

Implementation of a comprehensive counter insurgency failed in large measure due to the utter inability to achieve inter-agency coordination of intelligence issues between the IPKF, RAW, and the Intelligence Bureau (IB). This handicap is all the more amazing as RAW had been training the LTTE since 1983 and continued to do so.¹²⁴

Part of the explanation lies in the antipathy between the IPKF and RAW. Thus, the creation of a Special Forces HQ

with three battalions did not have the desired impact on the hearts and minds campaign.

The Indians were also new to the intricacies of sophisticated counter insurgency techniques. They did not appreciate the need for immediate interrogation of prisoners upon capture for the benefit of swift follow-up operations.¹²⁵ The degree of domestic breakdown in Sri Lanka further denied the IPKF the help of an efficient police force.¹²⁶ The Indians were thus missing a critical source of intelligence. As discussed above, the IPKF had to substitute for the radicalized, ethnically-motivated security forces.

Beyond these integration issues, the IPKF experienced chronic problems of tactical obstinacy in the field. The LTTE were inveterate ambushers and past masters of the booby trap. Yet units remained too road and trail bound and suffered constant mine casualties. Indian troops also adopted sloppy techniques. They tended to bunch. Officers became wed to large patrols, instead of sending a number of smaller patrols whom the LTTE would have had greater difficulty tracking. These patrols failed to drop off ambushers to trap the inevitable Tiger shadowers. Soldiers forgot elementary tactical principles and used ceremonial techniques. Thus, sentries guarding commanders' tents faced inward to render salutes promptly instead of outward to provide security.¹²⁷

The Indian Army learned many painful lessons in its first war since 1971. However, many viewed the March 1990 withdrawal as a defeat. The fall in Indian prestige can well be imagined. The government admitted an IPKF of 50,000, but even Indian commentators have estimated it closer to 100,000 at peak.¹²⁸ Yet it still failed to crush the LTTE. The temporary detente between the Premadasa government and the LTTE which ousted the IPKF added humiliation to apparent failure.

CONCLUSIONS

Observations on Indian Army Lessons Learned

Indian Army operations in Sri Lanka were classic OOTW as defined in current American doctrine.¹²⁹ This study will use American Field Manuals (FMs) to facilitate an assessment of the war.

The Indian Army studied its thirty-two-month experience extensively. A team of experts from the College of Combat based at Mhow reviewed the lessons of Sri Lanka.¹³⁰ The OFC himself later assessed each arm of service in his memoirs.¹³¹

While the strategic objectives for India were quite clear, the practicality of a peace-keeping mission was not.¹³² The Indo-Sri Lankan Accord certainly provided the mandate. However, the first general principle of peacekeeping requires the consent of the disputing

parties.¹³³ This guideline highlights the elementary logical flaw in the decision to deploy the IPKF. The questionable participation of the LTTE, the most powerful guerrilla organization, made the probability of failure high. Gandhi may have decided to risk Indian troops in Sri Lanka as his only remaining option to prevent the Sinhalese from implementing a military solution.

Subsequent troubles encountered by the IPKF were the result of planning failures. The preliminary schemes in April and May were far too general and lacked the requisite attention to detail.¹³⁴ Exercises for intervention were helpful, but on too small a scale compared with the massive troop deployment actually used.¹³⁵

The absence of joint command and control limited the ability to project armed forces beyond India's shores. The reader should be aware how Indian practice has no unitary Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. Individual service heads, i.e. component commanders, share equal responsibilities.¹³⁶

Consequently, the composition, formation, and employment of military forces was haphazard due to the sudden need to form the IPKF. Reserve units not facing the Chinese and Pakistani threats went to Sri Lanka. Officer transfers were extensive; in one case a brigadier's staff were unknown to each other.¹³⁷ There was neither the time nor the analysis to forecast possible changing roles on such short notice.

Sustainment thus remained a concern through most of the conflict. India had no forward stocks and political fears

of inflation and civilian welfare eliminated host nation support and local purchase as options for improvisation. However, once established, maintenance, ammunition resupply, and medical assets maintained uninterrupted support.¹³⁸

The deployment of a predominantly light-infantry force to undertake peacekeeping duties was in consonance with current American practice.¹³⁹ Moreover, their mission to attack the LTTE in Jaffna City conformed to the American judgment that light, air assault, and airborne infantry are "experts in urban warfare, . . ."¹⁴⁰. Lightly-armed but highly-mobile forces are even cited as normal for "Restoration and Maintenance of Order and Stability," a peace enforcement activity.¹⁴¹ However, American manuals also state that peacekeeping force composition can include the entire range of troop types.¹⁴² U.S doctrine further spells out methods for mixed light and heavy forces to subdue an urban-based enemy, i.e. movement on urban terrain (MOUT). Inside the built-up area, each light infantry company has a tank platoon in support.¹⁴³

The IPKF simply lacked the heavy equipment in Sri Lanka at the time of PAWAN to conduct a more effective urban assault. The ROE in any case emphasized minimal civilian casualties over optimal techniques.

Such restrictive ROE raise questions over the vulnerability of light infantry against foes, conventional or otherwise, armed with substantial firepower.¹⁴⁴ A

failure to address this concern could very well increase casualties.

Combat concerns assumed such significance that post-conflict planning was initially nonexistent, then very chaotic and inconsistent. Indeed, the tortuous links and breaks among the participants promised instead to wreck Sri Lankan social fabric for decades. The continued contacts of the LTTE with RAW and Tamil Nadu were injury enough to the IPKF.¹⁴⁵ Added insult was the supply of arms and ammunition to the LTTE by the Sri Lankan government during their unified effort to oust the IPKF off the island!¹⁴⁶

The IPKF tried to form the "Three Stars," a union of Tamils, Muslims, and Sinhalese. The organization instead consisted of three Tamil, anti-LTTE militant groups who enjoyed only limited success. The Sri Lankan government too recognized the need for a Tamil internal security organization and approved the Indian formation of the Citizens' Volunteer Force (CVF). Subsequent RAW efforts to mold the CVF into the Tamil National Army (TNA) composed of anti-LTTE militant groups faltered.¹⁴⁷

India officially denied the existence of the TNA, yet it was a genuine attempt to prepare for the post-conflict stage. The TNA would have been able to defend Tamils against the inevitable LTTE rampage once the Indian Army departed.¹⁴⁸

Indian Army experience in waging such a multi-dimensional conflict also provided first-hand lessons in

integrating the information element of national power at all levels. The Overall Force HQ received the Joint Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs to conduct press briefings, which Singh insisted would be frequent and truthful. However, journalists were barred from areas of fighting. Some Indians simply reported from the LTTE side, including representatives of the Calcutta Weekly, Sunday and India Today.¹⁴⁹

The IPKF never won comprehensively the hearts and minds campaign which would have eliminated popular support for the LTTE in the Northern Province. In time both Sinhalese and native-born Tamils both came to resent the IPKF's presence.¹⁵⁰ Indeed, there is even a story concerning a young Tiger guerrilla who spotted a helicopter and commented, "It's one of ours." It belonged to SLAF!¹⁵¹ Even the fanatical LTTE considered themselves Sri Lankans after all.

All these efforts were necessary to counter the highly-sophisticated LTTE propaganda campaign. The Tigers held regional conferences in Madras for international correspondents starved of news from the field and Colombo.¹⁵² They boasted at least three newspapers, one radio station, and one TV station in Jaffna which could communicate with Madras. The IPKF did once convince The Hindu to print an apology for unsubstantiated stories of Indian soldiers raping Tamil women.¹⁵³ One commentator bitterly acknowledged the success of the Tamil international

propaganda war. He believed that the LTTE had Western human rights organizations utterly fooled until the suicide bomber assassination of Gandhi himself on 20 May 1991¹⁵⁴--fourteen months after the withdrawal of the IPKF.

Finally, the IPKF probably saved Sri Lanka from becoming another Lebanon. The presence of Indian troops in northeastern Sri Lanka battling the LTTE permitted the government to concentrate its armed forces (SLAF) south to subdue the terrorism of the JVP.

Meanwhile, the ordeal of the IPKF has likely curbed any Indian penchant for future, hasty interventions. India's losses in Sri Lanka between July 1987 and March 1990 amounted to 1,115 KIA.¹⁵⁵ In comparison the 1971 war with Pakistan which established an independent Bangladesh cost 1,047 Indian KIA. At the time of writing the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka drags on.¹⁵⁶

Additional Ramifications for American OOTW

The experience of the IPKF in Sri Lanka provides the U.S. Army with a case study to anticipate pitfalls of OOTW. The seven Battlefield Operating Systems (BOS) provide a useful context in which to analyze these tactical lessons largely in terms of .¹⁵⁷

Maneuver. Are American soldiers prepared to be versatile within the confines of a single operation? The U.S. Army professes its commitment to versatility.¹⁵⁸ The Indian troops in Sri Lanka transitioned from peacekeeping to

peace enforcement involving an assault on a fortified city followed by a classic rural insurgency within nine weeks of deployment! Similarly, American troops deployed to Somalia ostensibly to provide humanitarian assistance, but soon became involved in restoration and maintenance of law and order for the protection of that humanitarian assistance. The unpredictable nature and rapid shifts in focus of OOTW can stretch versatility to the limit. There will probably be little time to provide special troop training since most deployments result from sudden crises. The U.S. Army does recognize that the entire range of peace operations may occur in the course of a single deployment.¹⁵⁹ However, the continued emphasis on light troops may be an indication of a misunderstanding of the challenges ahead. Light infantry lack the armored vehicles which minimize casualties.

Mobility, countermobility, and survivability (M/C/S). OOTW involving an array of mission types complicates M/C/S efforts due to the competition for limited engineer resources which are a major element of humanitarian assistance. Survivability, however, is a greater concern. Battlefield cleanup is merely one aspect of force protection. American soldiers in all MOSS and branches must be aware that mines and booby traps specifically targeted against them probably represent the greatest threat at any given time in most OOTW scenarios. Troops need specialized training to recognize possible devices, identify, and avoid if not disarm them. Otherwise mine casualties alone could

become a significant combat detractor with a commensurate fall in morale.

Fire support. Artillery and aviation remain valuable assets in OOTW should fighting break out. The current trend towards ever more accurate smart munitions will insure an integral role for fire support while reducing collateral damage. This firepower will be necessary to keep American casualties small, especially among light forces.

Air Defense. The U.S. Air Force has no opponent in the world at this time which can challenge American air supremacy. Nevertheless, soldiers should be ready to react to air attack. Any losses due to even what could be termed a "nuisance attack" would likely result in negative publicity with adverse effect on the continued prosecution of the mission. For example, the LTTE were actually working on an ultra-light aircraft which never became airworthy. Armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) could become a low-cost enemy alternative to conventional airpower.¹⁶⁰

Intelligence. Two significant lessons emerge from the Indian experience. First, underestimation of an opponent, potential or actual, courts disaster and remains a danger in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet state and the lopsided victory in the Gulf War of 1990-91. Accurate, unbiased intelligence on the capabilities of all parties involved in a contingency help immeasurably to tailor a force package. Yet, arguably, the annihilation of the 13 Sikh Lt Inf on 11 October 1987 in Jaffna City and the U.S.

Rangers on 3 October 1993 in Mogadishu suggest poor intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and hubris which denigrated the foe.¹⁶¹

However, a more critical concern is inter-agency coordination to achieve true integration of the national instruments of power, a necessary ingredient at tactical level in OOTW. Force-projection operations must strive for smooth relationships between the State Department, the CIA, and the armed services. The genuine combination of national, campaign, and tactical intelligence details has long been a problem. The United States can ill afford a failure similar to that which befell India because of the conflicting goals of the IPKF, RAW, and the IB.

Combat Service Support (CSS). The frequent primacy of CSS units in OOTW is unique compared to conventional war. This focus brings additional vulnerability given the volatile nature of these missions, particularly on busy LOCs. For example, the IPKF suffered countless ambushes along roads. Unlike combat units, logisticians remain largely tied to these routes. There should be a commensurate change in CSS training schedules for frequent refresher training in basic infantry skills essential for successful self defense.¹⁶²

Anticipation is perhaps the most demanding logistic characteristic in OOTW.¹⁶³ Support personnel must be prepared to respond rapidly to virtually any conceivable requirement. Staff officers should likewise plan to support


OPLAN branches due to "mission creep." In Sri Lanka the Indian Army suddenly faced an urgent and wholly unexpected demand for orthodontists due to jaw damage from powerful LTTE booby traps.¹⁶⁴

Command and Control. This BOS is a significant American strength, while a dangerous challenge as well. The United States has demonstrated the ability to conduct sophisticated joint operations better than any other power in the world. Its communications system is technologically high and constantly improving. There is no foreseeable scenario which would mirror the plight of the IPKF with antiquated signal equipment easily intercepted by the enemy--provided COMSEC is taken seriously.¹⁶⁵


The greatest challenge with potentially the most damaging consequences is planning. The experience of the IPKF in Sri Lanka and the U.S. Army in Somalia demonstrated the failure of staffs at the tactical level to formulate a concept of operation which could achieve the desired, clearly-stated political objectives in a timely, cost-effective manner. Yet, American military officers devote excessive emphasis demanding coherent political objectives with a clear end state. The challenge remains the development of viable plans. For example, the term "mission creep" is associated with a failure by the political leadership. In fact, the shortfall is among Army tactical planners. Emerging doctrine acknowledges the sheer scope of OOTW.¹⁶⁶ Planners must develop branches and sequels which


recognize and anticipate the volatile nature of OOTW where peacekeeping and peace enforcement may be minutes apart.


Tactical planners must accept the often-vague nature of political objectives and instead focus on thorough mission analysis which will yield detailed courses of action with appropriate branches and sequels. American troops should not be the victims of self-imposed "mission creep."


MAP 1: SRI LANKA IN A SOUTH ASIAN CONTEXT¹⁶⁷

MAP 2: SRI LANKA: MAJOR CITIES, LOC,
and ETHNIC CONCENTRATIONS¹⁶⁸




MAP 3: SRI LANKAN PROVINCIAL AREAS¹⁶⁹

MAP 4: INDIAN FEDERAL STATE BOUNDARIES¹⁷⁰

MAP 5 : JAFFNA PENINSULA¹⁷¹

MAP 6: OPERATION PAWAN, 10-26 OCTOBER 1987¹⁷²



APPENDIX 1

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CSC	Chiefs of Staff Committee
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff
CVF	Citizens' Volunteer Force
DCC	Defence Committee of the Cabinet
DDC	District Development Council
ECC	Emergency Committee of the Cabinet
IB	Intelligence Bureau
ICV	Infantry Combat Vehicle
IMSF	Indian Marine Special Forces
IPKF	Indian Peace-Keeping Force
JVP	Janata Vimukti Party
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NSG	National Security Group
OC	Officer Commanding
OFC	Overall Force Commander
PACC	Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet
RAW	Research and Analysis Wing
SFF	Special Frontier Force
SAG	Special Action Group
SG	Special Group
SLAF	Sri Lankan Armed Forces
SPG	Special Protection Group
SRG	Special Ranger Group
TNA	Tamil National Army
UNP	United National Party

APPENDIX 2

TENTATIVE ORDER OF BATTLE, INDIAN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE¹⁷³

4 Inf Div

36 Inf Div:	<u>18 Inf Bde</u>	<u>41 Inf Bde</u>	<u>72 Inf Bde</u>
	18 Garwhalis	5 Rajput Rifles	4/5 Gurkha Rifles
	12 Grenadiers		5 Para Bn
	4 Mahar		13 Sikh Lt Inf

54 Inf Div:	47 Inf Bde	6 Inf Bde	<u>91 Inf Bde</u>
(Air Assault)			5 Madras
			8 Mahar
			1 Mahratta Lt Inf

57 (Mountain) Inf Div

55 Ind Inf Bde

115 Ind Inf Bde

340 Ind Inf Bde

65 Armd Regt (T-72) detached from 31 Armd Div

25 Mech Inf Bn (BMP-1)

? Mech Inf Bn (BMP-2?)

? Arty Regt (105mm towed)

831 Lt Regt (heavy mortars)

10 Para Cdo Bn

Combat Support and Combat Service Support Units

NOTES

Text

¹Edgar O'Ballance, The Cyanide War: Tamil Insurrection in Sri Lanka, 1973-88 (London: Brassey's, 1989), 1.

²Lakshmanan Sabaratnam, "Sri Lanka: The Lion and the Tiger in the Ethnic Archipelago," in State Violence and Ethnicity, ed. Pierre L. van den Berghe (Niwot: University Press of Colorado, 1990), 188.

³See Maps 1, 2, and 3 on pages 45, 46, and 47.

⁴The ethnic conflict dominates the literature on Sri Lanka. A good starting point is Russell Ross and Andrea Savava, eds. Sri Lanka: A Country Study (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1988). Bernard Swan, Peace and Conflict in a Poor Country: Sri Lanka (n.p., 1986) is an economic study. Paulette Otis, Policies and Precipitants of Ethnic Conflict: Case Study Sri Lanka, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Denver, 1988 is a highly-specialized examination of the role of the modern state in ethnic conflict. Jonathan Spencer, ed. Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict (London: Routledge, 1990) is an essay collection. Somasundaram Vanniasingham, Sri Lanka: The Conflict Within (London: Sangam Books, 1989) has a legal-constitutional focus. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, The Break-up of Sri Lanka: The Sinhalese-Tamil Conflict (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1988) is a political analysis and memoir of sorts. Both Vanniasingham and Wilson are Tamils.

⁵The Honourable East India Company (HEIC) became the preeminent ruling power in India given the demise of the Moguls. The HEIC established three Presidencies for governing: Bengal, Bombay, and Madras. The Crown assumed direct control of Indian affairs after the Mutiny of 1857.

⁶Thus, between 1827-77 the Indian Tamil population of Ceylon grew from 10,000 to 1,046,000. P. S. Nathan et al., Alienated Eve Alienated Everywhere: A Study on the Conditions Indian Origins in Sri Lanka and the Sri Lanka Repatriates in India (Kodaikanal, India: Cerak, 1989), 11.

⁷Swan, Peace and Conflict, 6.

⁸Rohan Gunaratna, War & Peace in Sri Lanka, with a Post-Accord Report from Jaffna (n.p., 1987), 16.

⁹Judy Waters, "Origins of the Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: The Colonial Experience," South Asia Bulletin 6, no. 2 (Fall 1986):4, 7-8.

¹⁰Ravi Kant Dubey, Indo-Sri Lankan Relations, with Special Reference to the Tamil Problem (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1989), 12.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Wilson, Break-up of Sri Lanka, 6-7.

¹³Jayantha Perera, "Political Development and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka," Conflict 5, no. 2 (1992):138, 147n2 & 3. For more complete details consult Ceylon, Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution, Cmd. 3131 (London: HMSO, 1928). Soulbury became Governor General of Ceylon between 1948-54.

¹⁴K. M. de Silva, "Separatism in Sri Lanka: The 'Traditional Homelands' of the Tamils," in Secessionist Movements in Perspective, ed. Alan B. Anderson et al. (n.p., 1990), 34.

¹⁵Elizabeth Nissan and R. L. Stirrat, "The Generation of Communal Identities," in Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. John Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 19.

¹⁶Sabarathnam, "Sri Lanka: Lion and Tiger," 197-98.

¹⁷Dennis Austin and Anirudha Gupta, "Lions and Tigers: The Crisis in Sri Lanka," Conflict, no. 211 (1988):15.

¹⁸Hopelessness and Challenge: The Mission of the Church in Situations of Conflict, 124. This source is neutral and would gain nothing from skewed figures in any direction.

¹⁹Nathan, Alienated Everywhere, 141; Sabaratnam, "Sri Lanka: Lion and Tiger," 187.

²⁰This paper discusses the problem of the stateless persons below under Indian "Political Imperatives."

²¹The Sinhalese restrictions in university education were a particularly-damaging blow given Ceylon's well-established, quality system.

²²See Lakshmanan Sabaratnam, "Internal Colonies and Their Responses" South Asia Bulletin 6, no. 2 (Fall 1986):9-20.

²³Radhika Coomaraswamy, "Nationalism: Sinhala and Tamil Myths," South Asia Bulletin 6, no. 2 (Fall 1986):21-26.

²⁴Serena Tennekon, "Some Reflections on Revisionism and Nationalism: The Divayina Debate on Ethnicity and Social Change," South Asia Bulletin, 6, no. 2 (Fall 1986):27, 31.

²⁵See R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, "The People of the Lion: The Sinhala Identity and Ideology in History and Historiography," in Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 45, 78-79. One historian blamed the British for their interpretation that there had been a great Sinhalese civilization in the island's past which had declined and that there had always been distinct, antagonistic ethnic groups. See John D. Rogers, "Historical Images in the British Period," in Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. John Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 87.

²⁶Serena Tennekoon, "Newspaper Nationalism: Sinhala Identity as Historical Discourse," in Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 207-8, 221.

²⁷Kenneth Bush, "Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka," Conflict Quarterly 10, no. 2 (Spring 1990):48.

²⁸Jayedva Uyangoda, "Reinterpreting Tamil and Sinhala Nationalisms." South Asia Bulletin 7, nos. 1 & 2 (1987):39.

²⁹Dagmar Hellman-Rajanayagam, "The Politics of the Tamil Past," in Sri Lanka: History and the Roots of Conflict, ed. Jonathan Spencer (London: Routledge, 1990), 119.

³⁰There are three essays in Douglas Allen, ed. Religion and Political Conflict in South Asia (Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1992) which deal with the religious question in Sri Lanka.

³¹Chaplain (Maj.) Mark A. Henry, "The Role of Religion in the Tamil Insurgency of Sri Lanka," A598 Elective, Research in Low Intensity Conflict (Paper, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993), 32-33.

³²The essays in Hopelessness and Challenge all echo this theme.

³³Swan, Peace and Conflict, 33.

³⁴Mary Abraham and G. Anandalengam, "Left-Wing Politics and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka," South Asia Bulletin 6, no. 2 (Fall 1986):45.

³⁵Wilson, Break-up of Sri Lanka, 37, 42-43.

³⁶ Victor Ivan [Viktar Ayivan], Sri Lanka in Crisis: Road to Conflict (Ratmalana, Sri Lanka: Sarvodaya Book Publishing Services, 1989) is typical of a genre of historians placing the blame for Sri Lanka's woes squarely on economics. He is often polemical, always ecocentric.

³⁷ Ibid., 57.

³⁸ T. D. S. A. Dissayanaka, The Dilemma of Sri Lanka: An In-Depth Account of the Current Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (Colombo: Swastika (Pvt), 1993), 1.

³⁹ The previous emergencies were 1947-52, 1956-58, 1959-62, 1966-70, and 1977-82. Rohan Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka: The Role of India's Intelligence Services (Colombo: South Asian Network on Conflict Research, 1993), 4.

⁴⁰ Indian involvement forms the basis of discussion in the next section.

⁴¹ The debate over the ineptitude and/or careerism of the Tamil political leadership is an issue beyond the scope of this introduction. See V. Navaratnam, The Fall and Rise of the Tamil Nation: Events Leading to the Tamil War of Independence and Resumption of Eelam Sovereignty [sic] (n.p., 1991), 12.

⁴² Wilson, Break-up of Sri Lanka, 32, 34note, 39, 56.

⁴³ The British Raj was the British administration which ruled India in the name of the Crown between 1857-1947. India participated actively in both world wars with troops in virtually all theaters.

⁴⁴ S. D. Muni, Pangs of Proximity: India and Sri Lanka's Ethnic Crisis (New Delhi: SAGE Publications, 1993), 11-12 (Table 1), 13, 15. Intervention ranged from troop deployments to the acceptance of refugees. While the IPKF was in Sri Lanka, India sent other troops to the Maldives in November 1987 to assist the government put down a military coup.

⁴⁵ See Raju G. C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, Center for International and Strategic Affairs Series (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 12 for an analysis of diplomatic alignments and potential conflicts.

⁴⁶ Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 33-34.

⁴⁷ Dissayanaka, The Dilemma of Sri Lanka, 3. See Map 4, page .

⁴⁸ See Map 4, page 48.

⁴⁹ Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 80-81.

⁵⁰ Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 185, 187, 190-91, 194-95. Appendix 1, 185-203 is an excellent tabulation of "Indo-Sri Lankan Interaction on the Ethnic Crisis" between July 1983 and July 1987. The relative ease with which the two countries solved the problem of the stateless persons demonstrated how the Indian Tamils were a secondary issue.

⁵¹ Ibid., 194, 198-200.

⁵² The clear violation of Sri Lankan sovereignty mitigated the humanitarian mission in some international circles. The Indians also insured that the flights became a world-wide media event.

⁵³ Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, vii. RAW was involved in clandestine missions in Sri Lanka long before the decision to support the militants. See the breakdown of operations by phases below.

⁵⁴ There remains considerable disagreement over the training role of the active Indian Army.

⁵⁵ Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 4-9, 11, 33, 49.

⁵⁶ Ibid., 135-36, 341.

⁵⁷ Rajesh Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco: Peacekeepers at War (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1990), 162-67 contains the complete text, including the Annexure to the Agreement. A series of personal letters between heads of state acknowledged Indian security concerns; indeed, they arguably trampled Sri Lankan sovereignty.

⁵⁸ Gunaratna, War & Peace in Sri Lanka, 12-13. Ironically, Jayewardene's successor accomplished the elimination of the JVP threat. See Wilson, Break-up of Sri Lanka, 64.

⁵⁹ See Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 317-40 passim for a discussion of JVP efforts directed specifically against India.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 193, 193n1 &2. The incident brought no credit to Gandhi's personal bodyguards either. They froze. A Sri Lankan naval officer subdued the rating.

⁶¹ Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, facing 17 has a photo sequence of this incident.

62 The enticements included subsidies to the LTTE!

63 Gandhi and Jayewardene garnered Nobel Peace Prizes.

64 Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 197, 199.

65 Resolution 2.9 of the Accord and Point 3 of the Annexure, Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 164, 166.

66 Indian troops in World War II had served in North Africa, Abyssinia (Ethiopia and Somaliland), Italy, Malaya, and Burma. In World War I they saw service as far afield as France, Gallipoli, the Middle East, and Mesopotamia. During the nineteenth century Indian contingents had even participated in operations related to the "scramble for Africa."

67 The finest survey is Philip Mason, A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers, and Men (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974).

68 The British had recruited the "martial races" of India who were concentrated in the north. These included Punjabis, Rajputs, and Sikhs as well as the Gurkhas from Nepal. The southern groups, e.g. Madrassi, were considered inferior soldierly material. Interestingly, they dominated the technical services like engineers during World War II.

69 Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 120-22.

70 Note that the Indian Army uses British terminology. Hence, combined operations refers to U.S. joint ones and vice-versa.

71 Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 128-32 *passim*.

72 Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 143-44.

73 See Mohammed Ayoob and K. Subrahmanyam, The Liberation War (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co., 1972); E. R. Hooten, "Holding the Line: Pakistan Repulsed in the West," War in Peace, no. 72, 1984, 1432-33; Anthony Robinson, "Air Superiority: The IAF Rules the Skies," War in Peace, no. 72, 1984, 1434-35; and E. R. Hooten, "The Lightning Campaign: India's Victory in the East," War in Peace, no. 72, 1984, 1436-39.

74 Book-length monographs on the 1962 Sino-Indian War are lacking. See Nigel de Lee, "The Sino-Indian War," War in Peace, no. 40, 1983, 794-97.

⁷⁵These relatively-unknown actions were against the Nagas, Mizos, and Gharos. Nagaland and Mizoram both border Burma. Mizoram is a Union Territory (U.T.). Neville Maxwell, India and the Nagas, Minority Rights Group (MRG) Report No. 17 (London: MRG, n.d.) discusses the guerrilla war of the Nagas and Mizos, but focuses on Indian Army atrocities.

⁷⁶These Commands equate to the U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) with named armies.

⁷⁷International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), Military Balance, 1987 (London: IISS, 1987), 156.

⁷⁸Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 35-36. The regiment is an administrative unit only as in the British Army.

⁷⁹Ken Conby and Paul Hannon, Elite Forces of India and Pakistan, Elite Series, no. 41 (London: Osprey Publishing, 1992), 9, 21-23, 27-29.

⁸⁰Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 18, 36. This monograph maintains the British flavor of Indian unit designations.

⁸¹Conby and Hannon, Elite Forces of India and Pakistan, 15.

⁸²Lt. Gen. Depinder Singh, PVSM, VSM, The IPKF in Sri Lanka (n.p.: Trishul Publications, [1991]), 41, 43. See Maps 3 and 5, pages 47 and 49 for city locations.

⁸³Ibid., 49-51.

⁸⁴Ibid., 76-77, 123; Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 212-13, 219-20.

⁸⁵Many writers believe that the violence in fact marked a campaign by the LTTE to annihilate the other Tamil groups in order to establish undisputed leadership. Meanwhile, the LTTE complained to the IPKF that RAW was using other Tamil guerrilla groups against them.

⁸⁶Kadian, India's Sri Lankan Fiasco, 29.

⁸⁷Ivan, Sri Lanka in Crisis, 60; Otis, Policies and Precipitants of Ethnic Conflict, 265; and Swan, Peace and Conflict in a Small Country, 40-41.

⁸⁸Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 57.

⁸⁹See page -- below for further discussion.

90 O'Ballance, Cyanide War, 100.

91 See J. S. Common, "The Tamil Tigers: Guerrilla War in Sri Lanka," War in Peace, no. 105, 1985, 2100-2102 for a survey of the LTTE before 1984.

92 Robert C. Oberst, "Sri Lanka's Tamil Tigers, Conflict 8 (1988):191-94.

93 O'Ballance, Cyanide War, 126.

94 Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 92. The AK-47 needs no introduction. The G-3 is German.

95 Rohan Gunaratna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka, with a Post-Accord Report from Jaffna (n.p.: Institute of Fundamental Studies, 45-53. There is disagreement among the sources whether the Tigers were able to obtain Soviet SA-7 Grail manpack surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).

96 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 423-25 and Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 23-24, 167.

97 Gunaratna, War and Peace in Sri Lanka, 47.

98 The reader should note that a reconstruction of the IPKF's fighting is partly tentative given the classification of official materials.

99 The population at the time of the attack is not known for sure. Jaffna had already experienced a refugee exodus due to SLAF operations against the city.

100 Ibid., 111 says 50 percent. Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 38 cites 30 percent. The reader should recall that 54 Inf Div was a reserve formation. July was also the time of year when the Indian Army focused on the Pakistani and Chinese borders.

101 Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 98-99. The objective was the seizure of Prabhakaran himself.

102 Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 243. Singh confirms these details except he does not mention the failure in COMSEC. The parallels between the fight of 13 Sikh Light Infantry in Jaffna and the U.S. Rangers in Mogadishu in October 1993 are interesting.

103 See Map 6, page 50. Note that 45 Bde should be 41 Bde.

104 O'Ballance, Cyanide War, 103 cites the use of the Soviet BMD. The BMD is the IFV for Soviet/Russian

paratroops. Its use by India then was unconfirmed. Christopher F. Foss, Jane's Armour and Artillery, 1988-89, 9th ed. (Couladon, England: Jane's Information Group, 1988), 357. Vehicles were more likely BMP-1. Note that the Indians use the term Infantry Combat Vehicle (ICV).

¹⁰⁵ Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 93-94. Note that foreign armored squadrons are company-sized, not battalion-sized, units.

¹⁰⁶ Maj. Shankar Bhaduri and Maj. Gen. Afsar Karim, The Sri Lankan Crisis, Lancer Paper One (New Delhi: Lancer International, 1990) quoted in Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 248-49.

¹⁰⁷ O'Ballance, Cyanide War, 101.

¹⁰⁸ The basic Soviet model is the Mi-24. The Mi-25 is the export model.

¹⁰⁹ Capt. Anthony M. Schilling and Capt. Donald R. Sims, "The Battle for Jaffna: Artillery Lessons Learned," Field Artillery (April 1990):29.

¹¹⁰ Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, map facing 97, 111. Singh was adamant that the Indian Army reported all casualties accurately. Historians and journalists were not so sure. For example, O'Ballance, Cyanide War, 105 cited IPKF figures of 159 KIA and 535 WIA released on 28 October which were amended on the twenty-ninth to 214 KIA and 709 WIA.

¹¹¹ Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 117.

¹¹² Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 138-40.

¹¹³ These equate to the American search and destroy missions in Vietnam.

¹¹⁴ Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 1-5, 139-44 contains two reports by junior leaders of actions at the village level.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 93-94 contains the IPKF Order of Battle (OoB) for PAWAN.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 112; Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 247.

¹¹⁷ Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 129.

¹¹⁸ Ibid. 129-30.

¹¹⁹The EME corresponds to U.S. Army Ordnance Corps personnel involved in maintenance.

¹²⁰Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 51-54.

¹²¹Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 123-27.

¹²²Ibid., 52-53.

¹²³Ibid., 115.

¹²⁴See pages 15-16 above.

¹²⁵Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 257, 259, 265-66.

¹²⁶Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 61.

¹²⁷Ibid., 147-48.

¹²⁸Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 269.

¹²⁹Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, Operations, June 1993 (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 1993), 13-0 thru 13-8.

¹³⁰Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 142. No such source appears in his Bibliography. It is probably classified. India remains sensitive about making public military information of use to Pakistan.

¹³¹Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 145-67. Arm of service equates to branch.

¹³²The monograph cannot state with certainty whether the IPKF command knew and understood the political goals, though the evidence suggests so.

¹³³Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 1990), 4-1.

¹³⁴This conclusion is perforce based on open sources.

¹³⁵A joint exercise around Goa in early 1986 involved only the para bns. Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 111.

¹³⁶See Singh, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, 59-60.

¹³⁷Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 46.

¹³⁸Ibid., 157-64 and Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 143-44.

¹³⁹Note the use of 10th Mountain Division in both Somalia and Haiti. Recent practice does not, however, constitute doctrine.

¹⁴⁰Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 71-100-2, Infantry Division Operations: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 1993), 1-1.

¹⁴¹Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-23, Peace Operations, Draft Version 6 (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 1994), 2-9.

¹⁴²FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, 4-4.

¹⁴³Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 71-123, Tactics and Techniques for Combined Arms Heavy Forces: Armored Brigade, Battalion/Task Force, and Company/Team (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 1992), B-23 thru B-24. A comparison with Indian doctrine is not possible. Again, the Indian Army is loathe to discuss detailed military issues of interest to Pakistan in an open forum.

¹⁴⁴The vulnerability issue is a topic in its own right and the subject of another monograph authored by Maj. Robert Everson.

¹⁴⁵See the discussion on pages 13-15, 17 above.

¹⁴⁶Gunaratna, Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka, 291-94 *passim*.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., 272-75.

¹⁴⁸India held several coordination meetings during October-November 1989 to assure Tamil security after Indian troops left. See Muni, Pangs of Proximity, 238-51 (Appendix VIII).

¹⁴⁹Singh, IPKF in Sri Lanka, 96, 135-36.

¹⁵⁰Sabarathnam, "Sri Lanka: The Lion and the Tiger," 217.

¹⁵¹Gunaratna, War & Peace in Sri Lanka, 13.

¹⁵²Sabarathnam, "Sri Lanka: The Lion and the Tiger," 216.

¹⁵³Singh, IPKF in Sri Lanka, 71, 134.

¹⁵⁴Dissanayaka, Dilemma of Sri Lanka, 80-81.

155 There were an estimated 2500 WIA. Casualties among officers up to battalion commanders were severe.

156 As recently as 23 October 1994, a Tamil suicide bomber struck the capital city of Colombo. CNN labeled the attack as part of the eleven-year civil war, thus tracing the start of hostilities to the fighting sparked by the July 1983 rioting. One positive event was the peaceful election of the new Prime Minister in November 1994, a candidate in favor of negotiations with the Tigers. See "Outlook: Snapshot," U.S. News & World Report, 21 November 1994, 16.

157 Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 71-100, Division Operations (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 1990), 1-16 thru 1-21.

158 FM 100-5, Operations, 2-9.

159 FM 100-20, Peace Operations, 2-17 thru 2-18.

160 Gunaratna, War & Peace in Sri Lanka, 47.

161 Maj. Derek Miller is writing a monograph on the Somalia operation.

162 Renewed training should go further than small arms and include LAW and/or AT-4, and Stinger.

163 The other four are integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation. FM 100-5, Operations, 12-3 thru 12-4.

164 Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 48.

165 See Singh, IPKF in Sri Lanka, for details. 154-56.

166 FM 100-20, Peace Operations, 2-17 thru 2-18.

Maps

167 O'Ballance, Cyanide War, Frontispiece.

168 Ibid., 22.

169 Ibid., 34.

170 Thomas, Indian Security Policy, 2.

171 O'Ballance, Cyanide War, 46.

172 Ibid., 89. Note that 45 Bde should be 41 Bde.

Appendix 2

¹⁷³This Order of Battle (OoB) is a reconstruction of bits of information from the following works. The reader should bear in mind the restrictions imposed on research of foreign military forces in open sources. Kadian, India's Sri Lanka Fiasco, 38-48, 117; Singh, IPKF in Sri Lanka, 39-41, 93-94, 96-97.

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